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SOME COMPARATIVE NOTES ON ENGLISH
AND AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW
Sir Guenter Treitel*
I. INTRODUCTION
OMPARATIVE law studies have traditionally concentrated on
differences between civil and common law; but more attention is
now given to comparisons between legal systems within these two
families, and, in particular, to differences between the common law in
England and in the United States. No one can be better aware of such
differences than Joe McKnight, of whose four law degrees the first two
were taken in England and the last two in the United States. Such com-
parisons are of particular interest in those parts of the law which, starting
from shared common law principles, have moved (for reasons by no
means easy to fathom) in diverse directions.
Contract law provides one of the best sources of materials for making
such comparisons, since the general contours of the subject have re-
mained sufficiently similar in both systems to make the exercise possible,
while the differences that have developed between them are sufficiently
significant to make it interesting. There is, for example, a clear resem-
blance between Restatement (and Restatement 2d), Contracts, § 90 and
the English doctrine of promissory estoppel,' both serving the same pur-
pose of mitigating the requirement of consideration. But there is also the
significant difference between them that, while § 90 is expressed so as to
give rise to causes of action, the English doctrine is still thought of only as
discharging or reducing prior obligations,2 though this position may be
under threat as a result of a contrary development in Australia. 3 This is
perhaps more likely than the American doctrine to be influential in En-
gland since the Australian and English judicial styles of argument and
analysis are closer to each other than either is to the American.
A full discussion of such differences between English and American
contract law would occupy a fair-sized volume and so is beyond the scope
of these few general observations. But it may be appropriate here to go
* Vinerian Professor of English Law and a Fell6w of All Souls College, Oxford, 1979
-1996. Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford, 1954-1979. Fellow of the British Academy,
1977. Queen's Counsel, 1983. Knighted in the New Year Honours 1997. The author and
Professor McKnight were undergraduates together at Magdalen College from 1947.
1. Stretching back into the 19th Century: Hughes v. Metropolitan Ry. (1877) 2 App.
Cas. 439.
2. Combe v. Combe [1951] 2 K.B.215.
3. Waltons Stores (International Ltd. v. Maher (1988) 164 C.L.R 387.
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into two further points of this kind, before turning to some more general
matters of structure concerning the development of contract law in the
two systems.
II. THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES
The recognition of the rights of third party beneficiaries in most of the
United States (Massachusetts forming a notable exception until 1979) and
the refusal of the English common law, in general, to recognise such
rights forms probably the most significant difference between the con-
tract doctrines of the two systems. English courts have sometimes found
ways around their general rule "in a manner that can only command an
awed Transatlantic respect."'4 But our present concern is with a curious
historical point. The early development of the American third party ben-
eficiary doctrine is usually associated with the New York case of Law-
rence v. Fox,5 decided in 1859, while the development in England of the
contrary doctrine of privity of contract is, in turn, associated with the case
of Tweddle v. Atkinson,6 decided by the Court of Queen's Bench just two
years later. In Lawrence v. Fox, reference is made to earlier English cases
(which were in some conflict), but only by one of the dissentients; while
there is no reference to Lawrence v. Fox or to any other American deci-
sion in any of the reports of Tweddle v. Atkinson. Whether that case actu-
ally is authority for the English privity doctrine is, indeed, open to
argument; but the significant point is that it came to be regarded as such
in the late 1 9th Century, attempts by counsel in 1884 to resurrect earlier,
contrary, decisions being then judicially described as "mere pedantry". 7
Corbin, in an article published in England 8 in 1930 tried another line of
attack on the English doctrine: the core of his argument was that a third
party beneficiary doctrine was recognised in equity (where the promisee
was sometimes regarded as trustee of the promise for the third party) and
that this equitable principle prevailed over the contrary common law doc-
trine by virtue of the general statement in section 25(11) of the Judicature
Act 1873, 9 giving primacy to rules of equity where these conflicted with
rules of common law. But this reasoning did not convince the English
courts. In 1943, Corbin's article was cited in the Chancery Division by no
less distinguished an advocate than Denning KC' ° (soon to become Den-
ning J and later Lord Denning MR) but specifically rejected by the
court" in a decision that was approved on appeal without further explicit
4. Kessler and Gilmore, Contracts Cases and Materials, 2nd ed. (1970) 1127, comment-
ing on Beswick v. Beswick [1968] A.C. 58 where the third party was the promisee's admin-
istratrix and was held entitled in that capacity specifically to enforce the promise against
the promisor for her own benefit in her personal capacity.
5. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
6. (1861) 1 B. & S. 393.
7. Gandy v. Gandy (1884) 30 Ch. D. 57, 69.
8. 46 L.Q.R.12 (1930).
9. Now Supreme Court Act 1981, section 49(1).
10. Re Schebsman [1943] Ch. 366, 368.
11. Re Schebsman [1943] Ch. 366, 370, per Uthwatt J.
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reference by the appellate court to Corbin's article. 12 On the contrary,
English courts, while recognising the equitable doctrine, restricted its
scope on the ground that the inference of a trust where none was in terms
created would unduly limit the power of promisor and promisee consen-
sually to rescind or vary the contract. The operation of trust reasoning in
this field was viewed by them as an exception, of limited scope, to the
common law rule, rather than as a conflicting rule.
When, in the mid-20th Century, the English position came under judi-
cial attack from Denning LJ and from Devlin J13 (later Lord Devlin), no
further reliance was placed on Corbin's reasoning, though in one of the
cases in question Denning LJ did rely on the American third party benefi-
ciary rule, saying that the American courts had rejected what he called
the "new rule" in Tweddle v. Atkinson14 and had "followed the original
common law, which is much more in accord with the needs of a civilised
society."' 15 But the bewildering complexity of the judicially developed
American doctrine 16 seems to have been one of the reasons for the gen-
eral view17 in England that reform of the common law doctrine of privity,
which had become the target of frequent criticism in the House of Lords
and the lower courts, should not be undertaken on a step by step basis by
judicial decision but should be left to legislation. That reform finally
came with the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 which, while
not wholly abolishing the privity doctrine, creates, in the words of the
Law Commission Report on which the Act is based, "a general and wide-
ranging exception" to it.18 This is not the place for an extended analysis
of the Act; the point of interest here is that in three of its sections19 the
Act deals in a relatively succinct way with some of the central issues
which have been the source of so much litigation in the United States: the
circumstances in which rights of enforcement are prima facie acquired by
the third party; the effects, on the third party's rights, of rescission or
variation of the contract by agreement between promisor and promisee;
and the extent to which the promisor can rely against the third party on
defences and set-offs that would have been available to him against the
promisee. No one would pretend that legislative foresight in respect of
these matters (or of others dealt with in the Act) will turn out to have
been comprehensive or all-embracing; but the Act does provide a struc-
12. [1944] Ch. 83, where Uthwatt J.s reasoning was specifically approved at p. 104.
13. See, amongst other cases, Smith and Snipes Hall Farm Ltd. v. River Douglas Catch-
ment Board [1949] 2 K.B. 500; Drive Yourself Hire Co. (London) Ltd v. Strutt [1954]1 Q.B.
250; Pyrene Co. Ltd. v. Scindia Navigation Co. Ltd. [1954] 2 Q.B. 402, where the actual
issue was whether a person could be bound by a contract to which he was not a party.
14. Supra, n. 6.
15. Drive Yourself Hire Co. (London) Ltd v. Strutt [1954] 1 Q.B. 250, 274.
16. The account of it in Corbin on Contracts, Chapters 41 to 44 occupies more than
350 pages.
17. For a distinguished exception see Steyn LJ (now Lord Steyn) in Darlington B.C..
v. Wiltshier Northern Ltd. [1995] 1 W.L.R. 68, 76.
18. Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties, Law Com. No. 242
(1996), §5.16.
19. Sections 1 to 3.
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tured scheme which could scarcely have been attained (or attained so
quickly) if the development had proceeded on a case by case basis.
III. UNEXPECTED SUPERVENING EVENTS
The starting point for the doctrine of discharge by supervening impossi-
bility is considered, both in England and in the United States, to be
Blackburn J's famous judgment in Taylor v. Caldwell2°, where the de-
struction of a music hall which had been hired out for the giving of a
series of concerts was held to have discharged the contract of hire. The
resulting doctrine (or its subsequent expansion) came to be known in En-
gland as discharge by frustration and in the United States as discharge by
impossibility, impracticability and frustration of purpose. This difference
in terminology reflects (in part) the wider scope of the American, than
that of the English, doctrine, the latter being reluctant to recognise "im-
practicability" (as opposed to "impossibility"), though prepared (in the
well-known coronation cases) to recognise frustration of purpose, as a
ground of discharge. But our concern here is with the further difference
which relates to the legal effects of, rather than to the precise grounds for,
discharge.
The basic principle is that (in Blackburn J's words) "both parties are
excused" 21 from further performance; but this leaves outstanding the
problems which arise from one-sided or partial performance and from
expenditure incurred in reliance on the contract. In England, judicial so-
lutions of these problems came to be regarded as unsatisfactory or inade-
quate 22 so that a legislative solution was eventually provided by the Law
Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943; while in the United States simi-
lar problems were dealt with , except in the Field Code States, without
legislative intervention. The English legislation, however, dealt only in a
restricted way with the problem of expenditure which had been incurred
in reliance on the subsequently discharged contract and was wasted by
reason of the discharging event. Under the 1943 Act, relief can be
granted in respect of such expenditure only in favour of a party to whom
a payment of money was made or due under the contract before the time
of discharge 23 or on whom a valuable benefit other than money had
before that time been conferred.24 Neither of these alternatives would
apply on facts such as those of Taylor v. Caldwell, where the actual claim
made (and rejected) was by the hirers of the hall for the expenses which
they had wasted in preparing for the concerts, which the destruction of
the hall made it impossible to give. American cases support claims for
wasted expenditure in cases of so-called "essential reliance": i.e., where
20. (1863) 3 B. & S. 826.
21. 3 B. &. S. 826, 840.
22. See the Report cited in n. 34 below and the well-known Fibrosa case [1943] A.C.
32.
23. Section 1(2), proviso.
24. Section 1(3)(a).
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the reliance takes the form of performing obligations imposed by the con-
tract. 25 The Restatement, Contracts, 2d, § 272(2) goes further in giving
the courts a general discretion to "protect the parties' reliance interests"
where simple discharge would "not 'avoid injustice." It is strange to think
that the exercise of this discretion could, on facts such as those of Taylor
v. Caldwell, lead to a result precisely the opposite of that there reached in
a decision generally regarded as one of the more beneficent Victorian
innovations in the law of contract. Perhaps an American court, con-
fronted with this possibility, could avoid such a startling conclusion by
refusing to exercise the § 272(2) discretion on the ground that each party
had incurred expenses that were wasted in consequence of the super-
vening event. In the most recent English case on the point, the court
refused to exercise its statutory discretion under the 1943 Act on pre-
cisely this ground.26
IV. RESTATEMENTS AND CODES
Perhaps the most important structural difference between American
and English contract law in the 2 0 th Century is that the influence on the
subject in the United States of the Restatements and of the UCC (espe-
cially Articles 1 and 2) has had no real counterpart in England; and, as
what is as yet no more than a footnote to this point, one might add that
any influence which the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods might come to have on the general principles of
contract law in the United States will not be replicated in England so long
as the United Kingdom maintains its present reluctance to ratify this
Convention.
One could, of course, point to the fact that considerable parts of En-
glish commercial law were "codified" in a series of late 19'
h and early 2 0 1h
Century statutes such as the Bills of Exchange Act 1882, the Sale of
Goods Act 1893 (now 1979) and the Marine Insurance Act 1906. The last
of these "codes" has had no counterpart in the United States. Conversely
there is no very close English counterpart to the detailed American legis-
lation on bills of lading formerly contained in the Uniform Bills of Lading
Act (now superseded by UCC Article 7) and in the Federal Bills of Lad-
ing Act 1916 (now re-enacted in 49 USC Chapter 81): the English Bills of
Lading Act 1855 was, and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 which
has replaced it is, a much less comprehensive piece of legislation, de-
signed only to deal with a limited range of issues, the treatment of which
forms a relatively small part of the American legislation. Perhaps the
reason for this difference is that the concept of a "bill of lading" was, and
still is, much narrower in English than in American law and commercial
practice, being used in England only in relation to the carriage of goods
by sea and in the United States in relation also to carriage of goods by
25. e.g., Angus v. Scully 57 N.E. 674 (1900); Albre Marble and Tile Co. v. John Bowen
& Co. 155 N.E. 2d 437 (1959).
26. Gamerco S.A. v. 1CM/ Fair Warning Agency Ltd. [1995] 1 W.L.R. 1226.
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other means.27 In the 1 9 th and early 2 0 th Centuries, legal regulation of
carriage of goods by sea was not seen as a matter of high priority in En-
gland, while carriage by rail and inland waterway was regulated by a sep-
arate body of legislation, such as the Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1854,
requiring conditions of carriage to be reasonable, a requirement leading
to the judicial development of the so-called doctrine of the "fair alterna-
tive. ''28 In relation to carriage of goods by sea, freedom of contract pre-
vailed in England, so that English common law allowed the carrier to
exclude liability for negligence29 while American common law did not.30
The series of compromises on this point (and on others) initiated in the
United States by the Harter Act 1893 reached England only when the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1924 (now superseded by the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act 1971) gave effect to the Hague (now superseded by the
Hague-Visby) Rules.
Setting aside the question of coverage, the nature of the English Acts
codifying parts of commercial law differs from that of the UCC in that the
object of the English Acts was merely to embody the previous common
law in statutory form. It was not their purpose to introduce new con-
cepts, having no precise counterparts (though they may have had analo-
gies) in the previous common law, such as those found in the UCC under
the headings of (for example) "adequate assurance of performance" 31 or
"failure of presupposed conditions. '32 These seem rather to have been
derived, at least in large part, from civil law sources which it may not
have been politic to publicise at the time of the original adoption of the
Code. Indeed, the attempt to illustrate the latter concept by reference to
the English case of Ford & Sons Ltd. v. Henry Leetham & Sons Ltd33 is so
patently misguided (that case being concerned only with the interpreta-
tion of an express contractual provision for supervening events) that it is
scarcely credible to suppose that the draftsman was not aware of the
point. The adoption of many such UCC innovations by the Restatement
2d (the two examples given above being reflected in its §§ 251 and 261)
and their consequent influence on the development of general contract
law calls for no further comment here.
In the United States, academic lawyers contributed substantially to the
drafting of the UCC and of the Restatements, while in England there was
in the first half of the 2 0 th Century little influence on the development of
the law of contract from this quarter. One might speculate as to the rea-
sons for this contrast: it may have had something to do with the facts that
at that time many English judges did not have law degrees; that in En-
27. See now UCC §1-201(6).
28. Peek v. North Staffordshire Railway (1863) 10 H.L.C. 473.
29. Blackburn v. Liverpool, etc, S.N. Co. [1902] 1 KB 290.
30. Liverpool, etc, Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. 129 U.S. 397(1889).
31. §2-609.
32. §2-615 - interestingly, this phrase occurs only in the heading to, and not in the
legislative text of, the section.
33. (1915) 21 Corn. Cas. 55.
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gland few academic lawyers engaged to a significant degree in practice
and that direct movement from academic posts to senior judicial appoint-
ments was (and still is) unknown. The picture began to change in the
1930s with academic representation on the part-time bodies set up to
make recommendations for the reform of particular areas of the law re-
ferred to them by the Lord Chancellor; in the present context, it is of
interest to note that A.L. Goodhart, an American whose distinguished
academic career was almost exclusively in England, served as a member
of the Law Revision Committee. In the law of contract, one of that Com-
mittee's most successful exercises34 resulted in the passing of the Law
Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, mentioned above, though that
Act received further impetus from the need to resolve problems in the
law of contract which had arisen from the disruption of trade consequent
on the outbreak of the Second World War.35 Academic contribution to
law reform proposals continued in the United Kingdom with the creation
by the Law Commissions Act 1965 of the two Law Commissions, one for
England and one for Scotland. These are permanent, full time law re-
form bodies on each of which one Commissioner is, by tradition, an aca-
demic lawyer, and such lawyers have also acted as outside consultants to
the Commissions on specific law reform projects. Many recent legislative
changes in the English law of contract owe their origin, wholly or in part,
to the work of the English Law Commission; such changes include those
made by the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, the Minors' Contracts Act
1987 and the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, discussed
above.
Much the most ambitious project undertaken by the Law Commission
in the field of contract law was put forward in its First Programme of Law
Reform in 1965: it was that this branch of the law should be "examined
with a view to codification" since its "clarity and accessibility" were of
"the greatest importance" (it being presumably thought that these desid-
erata would be promoted by codification) and since this branch of the
law, being "well settled" was "ripe for codification." With hindsight, the
last of these statements must be regarded as (to say the least) over-opti-
mistic and to reflect a serious under-estimate of the difficulty of the pro-
ject. That difficulty was exacerbated by two decisions: first, to combine
codification with reform, a necessarily controversial process; and sec-
ondly, to produce (in collaboration with the Scottish Law Commission) a
code for the whole of the United Kingdom, so that it became necessary to
reconcile (or to reach compromises on) the many differences between
English and Scots contract law. A draft Code was produced but in 1972
the project was abandoned. One reason for this was that the Scottish
Law Commission withdrew from the exercise; and another, which in the
end proved decisive even in the purely English setting, lay in the precise
34. Law Revision Committee, 7th Interim Report (1939); Appendix A refers to Re-
statement, Contracts, §468.
35. See the Fibrosa case, above n. 22.
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and accurate style of legislative drafting adopted by Parliamentary Coun-
sel in England. This is widely different from the often vague and general
legislative language of, for example, corresponding provisions of the Field
Code in some of the United States, a difference perhaps reflected as long
ago as 1887 in Sir Frederick Pollock's criticism of that Code as "about the
worst piece of codification ever produced. '36 The English style of draft-
ing would have led to more readily predictable results and so could have
promoted the "clarity and accessibility" which were the Law Commis-
sion's objective (or at least the first of these qualities), though at the ex-
pense of flexibility. But the view taken at the time was that the task of
translating the draft Code into the language of an Act of Parliament was
so complex that, though a small part of it was accomplished, its comple-
tion would have called for efforts (and the use of legislative resources)
that were not commensurate with the benefits to be obtained. One sug-
gestion made at the time was that, instead of a Code, the Commission
might produce something in the nature of an English Restatement; but
this idea was not pursued. Comparison with the American scene would
seem to suggest that legislative energies are better directed towards a
Commercial Code than towards a Contract Code; and one might note
that codification was not, in the United States, identified as an ultimate
object of the Restatement, even though that enterprise shared with the
English codification project the objective of rendering the law "more
certain."37
V. CIVIL LAW INFLUENCES
Law is one of the more resistant of human institutions to the modern
process of globalisation; but even the law of contract has not been able to
escape from it entirely. Towards the end of the 2 0 th Century, English con-
tract law began to a considerable extent to be exposed to European conti-
nental civil law through the implementation in England (often by
secondary legislation) of European Community Directives. These have,
for example, been the source of legislation that regulates the relations
between "commercial agents" and their principals 38 and of much legisla-
tion in the field of consumer protection, most notably of the Unfair Terms
in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. 39 The quantity of legislation
from this source is considerable and growing; and English courts are
faced in it with a style of legislative drafting and with legal concepts that
will call for considerable agility and adaptability on their part.
In the United States, the dimensions of a similar problem are smaller;
but here too there has been some penetration of civil law concepts into
36. See Pollock and Mullah, Indian Contact and Specific Relief Acts, 9th ed. (1972) xii.The criticism may have been prompted by the incorporation of parts of the Field Code into
the Indian Contract Act 1872 and Specific Relief Act 1877.
37. Restatement, Contracts, p. viii.
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contract law as a result of the ratification by the United States of the
Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.
The point may be illustrated by the machinery provided by Articles
49(1)(b) and 64(1)(b) of the Convention, entitling a buyer to whom the
goods have not been delivered and a seller to whom the price has not
been paid to give notice to the party in breach requiring the latter to
perform within a further period specified in the notice and, if perform-
ance is not rendered within that period, to declare the contract avoided.
These provisions owe more to the German institution of the Nachfrist4 °
than to the common law (or more strictly equitable) rules as to notices
making time of the essence in contracts for the sale of land: for example,
such a notice binds both parties while the notices under the Vienna Con-
vention relate only to the obligations of the party to whom they are given.
The analogy between the Vienna Convention notices and the concept of
adequate assurance of performance (itself, as noted above, probably de-
rived from a civil law source41) is also imperfect: for example, the Vienna
Convention notices must follow, while the request for adequate assurance
may (and usually will) precede, breach; and the former must, while the
latter need not, specify a fixed (extended) period for performance.
The observations here made are intended to be of a predominantly ret-
rospective nature and do not aspire to prophecy. Already English courts
have accepted that their traditional approach to the interpretation of leg-
islation will have to be modified in the interpretation of domestic imple-
mentation of European Community law.42 Apart from this point, the
question of how English and American courts will integrate civil law con-
cepts and methods into their common law systems cannot yet be an-
swered with any degree of certainty. The only safe prediction is that the
process will be a difficult and an interesting one.
40. BGB §326.
41. BGB §321.
42. Litster v. Forth Dry Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd [1990] 1 A.C. 546, 559.
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